The 'morning after' regime change:
Should US force democracy again?
Reconsider the
US success rate before
forcing democracy again
By
Minxin
Pei and Sara
Kasper
Christian
Science Monitor, from the
January 15,
2003 edition -
http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0115/p09s02-coop.html
WASHINGTON - Recent press
reports of the Bush administration's plans for a post-Hussein Iraq have
underscored Washington's determination to seek a regime change in Baghdad, even
though the White House claims that its primary objective remains disarming
Iraq.
Instead of
becoming giddy over the prospects of a new democratic
Iraq, President Bush's
advisers should review Washington's own - decidedly
mixed - record of regime change and temper their optimism.
Among the
major powers, the US has engaged in the
largest number of regime changes. Since the past century, it has deployed its
military to impose democratic rule in foreign lands on 18 occasions. Yet this
impressive record of international activism has left an uninspiring legacy. Of
all the regimes the US has replaced with
force, democratic rule has been sustained in only five places -
Germany,
Japan,
Italy,
Panama, and
Grenada. This suggests a
success rate of less than 30 percent. Outside the developed world and
Latin
America, there hasn't been a
single success.
In
Latin
America, the
US efforts of regime
change removed old dictatorships, but failed to rebuild new democracies. In
Cuba, the
Dominican
Republic,
Haiti,
Nicaragua, and
Guatemala, repeated direct
American military interventions, including lengthy occupations, resulted only in
new dictatorships. The only two successful cases of building democracy by force
were Grenada in 1983 and
Panama in 1989, one a tiny
island and the other a small country where the
US has based tens of
thousands of troops.
The dearth of
success in regime change was not for lack of trying. The
US occupied
Cuba and the
Dominican
Republic twice for extended
periods in the past century. It stayed engaged in
Haiti continuously for 19
years and in Nicaragua intermittently for 24
years in the early part of the 20th century. But in each case, US efforts came
to nothing. The most discouraging case is
Haiti. The last time the
US tried a regime change
in the impoverished and ill-governed nation was 1994. Although US-led forces
peacefully ousted the junta and reinstalled the democratically elected
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Haiti's democracy unraveled
again quickly. Today, the nation is mired in poverty and misrule under the same
Aristide.
Washington's record is better in
the more developed parts of the world. In postwar
Japan,
Germany, and
Italy, US-led occupation
forces successfully rebuilt democratic institutions. In these three countries,
the state institutions were relatively strong and effective; their societies
were more modern; all had brief histories of democratic rule. They were among
the more promising candidates for democracy-building. In the developing world,
on the other hand, US projects of regime change have been marked mostly with
failures and disappointments.
Three lessons
emerge from past American experience that President Bush should heed. First,
given the overall low rate of success in regime change, a similar operation in
the Middle East, a tough geopolitical neighborhood far away from American
shores, carries greater risks and has less chance of success.
Iraq, with 24 million
people and a volatile ethnic mix, would be one of the most ambitious
US
projects.
Second, the
overthrow of the old dictator never guarantees a successful regime change. The
critical factor is the occupier's capacity to transform weak state institutions,
such as the bureaucracy, courts, and military, into effective instruments of
governance. Most outsiders fail in this attempt. Even lengthy commitment does
not produce desired results.
Third,
unilateralism makes things worse, even though multilateral efforts do not
necessarily ensure success. Nearly all of the United States' attempted regime
changes in Latin America were unilateral, with high costs both to the American
image in the region and Washington's ability to sustain domestic political
support for the undertakings.
Iraq should be the last
place for the US to repeat the same
mistakes.
• Minxin
Pei and Sara Kasper are a senior associate and a junior fellow, respectively, at
the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in
Washington.
US track record on
nation building
Country/
Years/ Multilateral or Unilateral/ Democracy after 10
yrs.?
1.
Afghanistan 2001-present Multilateral ?
2.
Haiti 1994 Multilateral
NO
3.
Panama 1989 Unilateral
YES
4.
Grenada 1983 Multilateral
YES
5.
Cambodia 1970-73 Unilateral
NO
6. South
Vietnam 1965-73 Unilateral NO
7. Dominican
Rep. 1965-66 Unilateral NO
8. Japan
1945-52 Multilateral YES
9. West
Germany 1944-49 Multilateral YES
10.
Italy 1944-47 Multilateral
YES
11. Dominican
Rep. 1916-24 Unilateral NO
12.
Cuba 1917-22 Unilateral
NO
13.
Haiti 1915-1919 Unilateral
NO
14.
Honduras 1924-1925 Unilateral
NO
15.
Nicaragua 1909-27 Unilateral
NO
16.
Mexico 1914 Unilateral
NO
17.
Nicaragua 1909 Unilateral
NO
18.
Cuba 1906-1909 Unilateral
NO
NOTE:
Included are only the cases where American ground troops are committed; excluded
are cases of humanitarian interventions, such as Somalia (1993) and Bosnia
(1995) and cases where the US used proxies to overthrow hostile
regimes.
Compiled by
Minxin
Pei and Sara
Kasper